Slopsquatting: The AI Hallucination That Infects Your Codebase

For years, the cardinal sin of software supply chain security was the typo. A single misplaced keystroke in an npm install command—expresss instead of express—could lead to a malicious package, a compromised build server, and a very bad day for your security team. We trained our developers, we implemented scanners, and we learned to fear the fat-finger error. This was typosquatting, and we thought we understood the enemy. However, these attacks are just one manifestation of broader software supply chain security risks that require comprehensive mitigation.

But what if the typo wasn’t yours? What if your trusted AI code assistant, in a moment of confident creativity, simply invented a malicious package and served it to you on a silver platter?

Welcome to “Slopsquatting,” the next generation of supply chain attacks. Coined by researchers at Mend.io, this new vector weaponizes the very AI hallucinations we’ve been warned about, turning our helpful AI co-pilots into unwitting agents of malware distribution. This isn’t just a theory; it’s happening now, and it fundamentally changes the nature of trust in our development pipelines.

What to Remember

• AI assistants “hallucinate” plausible but non-existent software package names.
• Attackers register these fake names on public registries (like NPM or PyPI), turning them into malware traps.
• This bypasses human checks for typos because developers implicitly trust the AI’s authoritative suggestion.
• The new security reflex is simple: Never blindly trust or install a package recommended by an AI. Verify, then trust.

What is AI Slopsquatting? When “Helpful” Becomes Harmful

Think of your AI code assistant as a brilliant, incredibly fast, but occasionally over-eager assistant. When you ask it for a library to solve a problem, it scans its vast knowledge base of code from across the internet. But sometimes, when it can’t find a perfect match, it doesn’t just say “I don’t know.” Instead, it hallucinates.

It invents a package name that sounds plausible, logical, and contextually perfect for your request. It might combine common words, suggest a new version, or simply make up a name that fits the pattern of what should exist. This is the “sloppy” output that gives “slopsquatting” its name.

The problem is, threat actors are listening. They can proactively monitor for these common AI hallucinations, register the non-existent package names on public registries like NPM or PyPI, and lie in wait.

The New Kill Chain: From Innocent Prompt to Infected Pipeline

The attack is terrifyingly simple and requires zero mistakes from the developer.

• The Prompt: A developer asks their AI assistant for help. “I need a JavaScript library to parse and colorize log files. What should I use?”
• The Hallucination: The AI, in its effort to be helpful, hallucinates a plausible but non-existent package name. Instead of the real chalk library, it might confidently suggest a package like chalk-colorizer-pro.
• The Trap: A threat actor has already identified this common hallucination and has registered the chalk-colorizer-pro package on NPM. This package is a Trojan horse, containing a malicious preinstall script.
• The Trust: The developer, trusting the AI’s authoritative recommendation, copies the command: npm install chalk-colorizer-pro. They didn’t make a typo. They did exactly what their trusted co-pilot told them to do.
• The Compromise: The moment the command is run, the malicious preinstall script executes, downloading an info-stealer, exfiltrating cloud credentials, and compromising the developer’s machine or, even worse, the CI/CD pipeline.

Why Slopsquatting is More Dangerous Than Typosquatting

This new vector is far more insidious than its predecessor for a few key reasons:

• It Bypasses Human Vigilance: Typosquatting relied on a human making a mistake. Slopsquatting relies on a human trusting a machine. We’ve spent years training developers to double-check their spelling; we haven’t yet trained them to doubt their AI’s suggestions.
• The Recommendations are Plausible: The hallucinated packages often have names that are contextually perfect, making them seem even more legitimate than a simple typo.
• The Attacker’s Job is Easier: Attackers no longer have to guess at common misspellings and register hundreds of domains. They can simply query LLMs themselves, identify the most common package hallucinations, and register just a few high-probability targets.

The Developer’s Action Plan: A New Security Reflex for the AI Era

Banning AI assistants is not a viable solution. The only path forward is to adapt our security practices and develop a new set of reflexes for this new reality.

• Verify, Then Trust: This is the new mantra. Never blindly copy-paste a package name suggested by an AI. Before you install any new dependency, take the five extra seconds to search for it on NPM, PyPI, or its official GitHub repository. Check its download stats, its version history, and its publisher. If it has a low download count or was just created, treat it as hostile. This aligns with the broader principle of least privilege in access control.
• Pin Your Dependencies: Always use lock files (package-lock.json, poetry.lock, etc.). This ensures that your builds are always using specific, known-good versions of your dependencies and prevents a malicious update from being automatically pulled into your project. This is a core aspect of secure supply chain practices.
• Implement a Private Registry: For enterprise environments, the most robust defense is a private package registry like JFrog Artifactory or Sonatype Nexus. This creates a secure “quarantine” where open-source packages can be vetted and approved before they are made available to your internal developers and CI/CD pipelines.

Conclusion: Trust, but Verify the Hallucination

AI Slopsquatting marks a significant evolution in software supply chain attacks. It weaponizes the very trust we are placing in our AI tools and turns their most creative feature—the ability to generate novel text—into a security vulnerability.

As we move deeper into the AI era, we cannot afford to be naive. The convenience of AI-generated code comes with a new and profound responsibility. The future of secure development will not just be about writing good code, but about rigorously questioning the code and the dependencies that our AI partners suggest. In the age of AI, the new mantra is simple: Trust, but verify the hallucination.

To further enhance your cloud security and implement Zero Trust, contact me on LinkedIn Profile or [email protected].

AI Slopsquatting FAQ

• What is AI Slopsquatting? AI Slopsquatting is a new type of software supply chain attack where threat actors register malicious software packages that have been “hallucinated” or invented by AI code assistants. Developers who trust the AI’s recommendation and install the non-existent package end up downloading malware.
• How is this different from typosquatting? Typosquatting relies on a user making a spelling mistake when typing a package name. Slopsquatting exploits a developer’s trust in a machine’s recommendation, even if the developer makes no error themselves.
• What is an AI “hallucination” in this context? It’s when a Large Language Model (LLM) generates a response that is factually incorrect but presented as if it were correct. In this case, the AI confidently invents a package name that sounds plausible but does not actually exist in the official registry (at least, not until an attacker registers it).
• What is the best way to protect myself as a developer? The single most important step is to never blindly trust a package name suggested by an AI. Always take a moment to verify the package on its official registry (like NPM or PyPI) to check its popularity, history, and legitimacy before installing it.
• How are attackers finding these hallucinated package names? They can simply query the same AI models that developers use, asking for package recommendations for various tasks. By identifying the most common hallucinations, they can proactively register those names and set their traps.

Relevant Resource List

• Mend.io Blog: “The Hallucinated Package Attack: ‘Slopsquatting’” (Origin of the term and concept)
• Dark Reading: “Malicious NPM Packages Created to Be ‘Invisible’ Dependencies”
• Trend Micro: “Slopsquatting: When AI Agents Hallucinate Malicious Packages”
• OpenSSF (Open Source Security Foundation): For general best practices on securing the software supply chain.